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Introduction
In the long-standing debate on optimal monetary policy, how central
banks should respond to exchange-rate volatility remains an open
question. A pure theory argues that exchange-rate fluctuations are to-
tally instrumental in adjusting relative prices, regardless of the degree
of trade openness. In such an idealistic world, central banks should
make no attempt to control currency movements and reduce the vari-
ability of import prices.
However, if changes in terms of trade are destabilizing forces on
our economies, central banks should react to the exchange-rate fluc-
tuations. Corsetti and Pesenti’s（２００５）analysis showed that monetary
policy that takes no account of changes in exchange rates and their
spillover effects on foreign exporters’markups and profits is ineffi-
cient and suboptimal. Optimal monetary policy in such economies
should stabilize a CPI-weighted average of the markups of all firms
selling in the domestic markets. Devereux and Engel（２００３）showed
that exchange-rate adjustment was a central part of an optimal mone-
tary policy when prices were likely to be set in producers’currency.
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Devereux and Engel（２００１）argued that a country with a highly vola-
tile monetary policy would find that its import prices would be set in
producers’currency, which in turn would lead to a high rate of pass-
through from exchange rates to import prices.
A common feature of these previous works is that the degree of ex-
change rate pass-through is important for inflation and that monetary
policy can contribute to stabilizing the fluctuations of inflation rate de-
rived from exchange-rate shocks.
By what mechanism then can central banks control price fluctua-
tions due to external volatility？ Taylor（２０００）argued that monetary
policy could affect the expected persistence of price and cost move-
ments. The extent to which firms increase costs due to a depreciation
of exchange rates by raising their price depends on how persistent
the increase is expected to be. Effective monetary policy can make
the expected depreciation of the currency less persistent and may be
able to produce smaller pass-through from expected changes in im-
port prices to aggregate prices.
The purpose of this paper is to show empirically that central banks
can indeed stabilize general price indexes by effectively controlling
the persistence of the expected changes in exchange rates.
We should note another important argument on this issue. Campa,
Goldberg and Gonzales-Minguez（２００５）and also Campa and Goldberg
（２００２）concluded that the argument by Taylor（２０００）was not of pri-
mary importance. They showed that the most important determinants
of changes in exchange rate pass-through were microeconomic and re-
lated to industry composition. A larger share of imports in total indus-
try supply, a higher degree of price discrimination, or a larger share
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of imported inputs in production in the destination country leads to
higher pass-through rates of exchange rates into import prices. If
these are true, monetary policy might lose its practical contribution
despite the theoretical role emphasized by the previous works.
However, the works referred to above only analyzed the transmis-
sion of changes in exchange rates to import prices and did not test
statistically how and to what extent import price changes are trans-
mitted to general prices, such as the Consumer Price Index. Campa et.
al., ibid.（２００５）themselves recognized that the degree of pass-through
into aggregate prices was substantially small, although transmission
rates from exchange rate movements to import prices were quite
high in the Euro area and across the OECD countries. They also indi-
cated that it was possible that inflationary shocks arising through im-
port prices due to domestic currency depreciations triggered contrac-
tionary responses from central banks and that such monetary policies
could insulate aggregate prices from exchange rate-induced inflation-
ary pressures（see also Gagnon and Ihrig（２００４））.
Thus, the role of monetary policy does not necessarily contradict
microeconomic explanations in the sense that monetary policy can not
only stabilize fluctuations of exchange rates but also drive a wedge
into the transmission from border price changes to aggregate price in-
flation. In this sense, we also expect that this paper contributes to fill-
ing the gap between the role of monetary policy and the micro-
economic arguments.
We will proceed with the analysis based on Japanese data, as Japan
is a rather surprising but informative exercise. Japan has experienced
the lowest inflation rate, although it has the highest pass-through elas-
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ticity from exchange rates to import prices among G-７ countries and
the second highest pass-through elasticity from exchange rates to im-
port prices across the OECD countries. Moreover, according to Campa
and Goldberg（２００２）, Japan’s elasticity is far higher than the average
across the OECD countries, regardless of the type of imported goods.
Thus, the effect of exchange rate pass-through is rather a macro-
economic phenomenon, particularly in Japan. In this sense, we can
treat Japan’s case as an informative example to test the role of mone-
tary policy whilst not denying that the issue is closely related to mi-
croeconomic structure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We briefly ex-
amine the relationship between the elasticity of exchange rate-pass
through and the inflation rate in Section１. In Section２, we estimate a
forward-looking monetary policy reaction function taking account of
the effects of the yen-dollar rate on the CPI inflation rate. We show in
this section that the more persistent the inflationary pressure arising
through expected currency depreciations was, the more strongly and
preemptively the Bank of Japan responded to inflation. In Section３,
we verify monetary policy effects on exchange rate and inflation rate
expectations, based on the recursive structural VAR method. All of
the impulse responses, the Granger causality tests and the forecast er-
ror variance decompositions reveal that monetary policy effectively
contributed to reducing the expected persistence of the exchange rate
and that the latter was significantly associated with the inflation rate.
Thus, we confirm that monetary policy can stabilize exchange rate-in-
duced inflation by driving a wedge into（the persistence of）expected
depreciations of the domestic currency. Section４ concludes with some
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policy implications.
１．A brief review of the relationship between pass-through and
inflation rate
In this section, we briefly review the relationship between the infla-
tion rate of an aggregate price and the pass-through elasticity of ex-
change rates. Table１ shows the average inflation rates measured by
the Consumer Price Index and the exchange rate pass-through into
import prices across the OECD countries. Figure１plots these data.１）
Table１ and Figure１ suggest that there is no clear relationship be-
tween the inflation rate and the pass-through elasticity. While most of
the OECD countries have enjoyed a lower inflation rate than ５ per-
cent, particularly since the １９９０s, the pass-through elasticities are
widely varied between０．４１（US）and１．３７（Ireland）. Moreover, when
we see the cases of G-７ countries, they even reveal a negative rela-
tionship between the pass-through elasticity and the inflation rate.
Here, this evidence may lead to a misleading conclusion that the de-
gree of exchange rate pass-through is not associated with either the
inflation rate or monetary policy.
However, these high pass-through elasticities into import prices do
not contradict low inflation rates. Contrary to the conclusion by
Campa and Goldberg（２００２）, stable monetary policy can play an im-
portant role in controlling inflation by driving a wedge into the trans-
mission from import price changes to aggregate price inflation. That is,
１）We owe the data on the pass-through elasticties（what they call‘long-run
elasticties’）to Campa and Goldberg（２００２）.
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Table １: CPI inflation rates and long-run pass-through elasticities into im-
port prices, OECD coutries
Average inflation rates＊
（measured in CPI）
ERPT＊＊
to import prices
１９９１―２００５ １９７９―２００５ １９７５―１９９９
Australia ２．４９ ５．１０ ０．６９
Austria ２．２２ ２．９１ １．２５
Belgium ２．０７ ３．２６ ０．７１
Canada ２．１１ ４．１０ ０．６８
Denmark ２．０８ ４．１７ ０．６８
Finland １．６４ ４．０８ ０．８２
France １．７９ ４．２４ １．２１
Germany ２．１６ ２．５２ ０．７９
Greece ７．３９ １２．７７ －０．０２
Hungary １５．５７ １３．６７ ０．８５
Iceland ３．５３ １８．９０ ０．７６
Ireland ２．８８ ５．６７ １．３７
Italy ３．３１ ６．７８ ０．６２
Japan ０．４１ １．４２ １．２６
Netherlands ２．４６ ２．６７ ０．７７
New Zealand ２．００ ６．２４ ０．６２
Norway ２．１４ ４．６１ ０．７９
Portugal ４．３７ １０．３４ ０．８８
Spain ３．６７ ６．６６ ０．５６
Sweden ２．０５ ４．７２ ０．５９
Switzerland １．５９ ２．４３ ０．９４
United Kingdom ２．８５ ５．１９ ０．４７
United States ２．７１ ４．１８ ０．４１
＊）Inflation rates are measured by percentage change from previous year.
＊＊）These pass-through elasticities are from Campa and Goldberg（２００２）, Table１.
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Figure １: CPI inflation rates and long-run pass-through elasticities into im-
port prices
A．CPI inflation rates and long-run ERPT to import prices（１９９１―２００５）
B．CPI inflation rates and long-run ERPT to import prices（１９７９―２００５）
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monetary policy can effectively stabilize inflation sourced from
changes in import prices due to depreciations of the exchange rate.２）
In this respect Japan is quite a surprising but informative example.
Japan has experienced the lowest inflation rate although it had the
highest pass-through elasticity among G-７ countries and the second
highest pass-through elasticity across the OECD countries. Figure２
shows Japan’s pass-through elasticities from the changes in import
prices to the CPI inflation rate for the１９７９ to１９９７ period. We can de-
rive interesting features from this figure. First, the elasticity was al-
Figure ２: Pass-through elasticity from import prices to the CPI in Japan
（１９７９―９７）
２）Campa, Goldberg and Gonzales-Minguez（２００５）referred to this role of mone-
tary policy.
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ways less than one, except for the third quarter of１９８０. Second, the
average elasticity of this period was negative（－０．０１１）and it was
very small relative to exchange rate to import price elasticity. Third,
these elasticities are equal to or less than zero for ４１ of the total ７５
quarter samples.
Now, the question is why the degree of pass-through into the aggre-
gate price index is substantially smaller than the degree of pass-
through into import prices. As Corsetti and Pesenti（２００５）, Campa et
al.（２００５）, Gagnon and Ihrig（２００４）, Devereux and Engel（２００１）and
Taylor（２０００）, among others, pointed out, monetary policy may be
able to stabilize the inflation rate by insulating aggregate prices from
exchange rate-induced inflationary pressures.
In particular, the contribution by Taylor（２０００）is the most relevant
to the analysis of this paper. Taylor argued that monetary policy
could stabilize exchange rate-induced inflation by influencing the ex-
pected persistence of domestic currency depreciations. He also as-
serted that a low inflation environment led to the decline in pass-
through or pricing power of firms. It is worthwhile investigating
whether monetary policy contributed to stabilizing inflation despite
the high pass-through rate into import prices in this line of research.
Here, we focus on the case of Japan.３）As we stated in the Introduc-
tion, in Japan, the effects of exchange rate pass-through are strongly
and widely spread, regardless of the type of imported goods and in-
dustries. Thus, it seems to be rather a macroeconomic problem to in-
３）Another important reason is that the forecasted series of the variables used
in estimations are not available for countries other than Japan.
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vestigate how Japan experienced low inflation despite the very high
pass-through elasticity. That is, we can consider Japan’s case as an in-
formative representative to test the role of monetary policy.
Our sample period is from the first quarter of １９７９ to the third
quarter of１９９７. It starts in the first quarter of１９７９ because the series
of the potential output is only available from that time, as we discuss
below. The reasons why our sample period ends in the third quarter
of１９９７ are as follows. After the successive bankruptcy of major finan-
cial institutions in November１９９７, the Bank of Japan began to utilize
monetary policy to eradicate anxiety about financial stability. It low-
ered the call rate target when the Russian crisis occurred in August
１９９８, as it feared that the crisis would damage the banking sector and
the financial system. Moreover, a so-called“zero interest rate policy”
was adopted in early １９９９, in accordance with the infusion of public
capital into the banking system to sweep off liquidity and financial
risk.
These successive reductions of the call rate to protect financial sta-
bility can contaminate the estimation of usual policy reaction function
against inflation, real output and the yen exchange rate. Furthermore,
a zero interest rate over one and a half years may also damage this
estimation. Hence, we exclude the period after the third quarter of
１９９７ from our sample period.
２．Policy Response to the Exchange Rate
In this section, we specify and estimate policy reaction functions for
the Bank of Japan to see how aggressively it reacted to expected in-
flation, in particular, due to depreciations of the exchange rate.
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２．１．The Estimation model
The following equation（１）is similar to Clarida, Gali and Gertler
（１９９８）and Bernanke and Gertler（１９９９）, and includes the inflation
gap, the output gap and the exchange rate gap as monetary policy
goals.
it＝const.＋ait－１＋bE［pt＋j Wt］＋gE［yt－y＊ Wt］＋dE［zt＋j－z＊ Wt］＋ut
（１）
where it is the policy instrument, which is the level of the nominal
overnight call rate in period t. it－１ is the lagged rate, assuming that
the Bank of Japan tends to smooth changes in the call rate. pt＋j is the
rate of inflation measured by the Consumer Price Index between peri-
ods t and t＋j and yt is the log level of real GDP in period t. We add
an exchange rate gap term, where zt＋j is the log level of the nominal
yen-dollar rate in period t＋j. y＊ and z＊ are respective target values
for real GDP and the exchange rate levels defined below. E is the ex-
pectation operator and Wt is the information available to the Bank of
Japan at the time it sets the policy interest rate. In addition, equation
（１）assumes a first-order partial adjustment mechanism of the over-
night call rate.
Equation（１）is a forward-looking version of the simple backward-
looking reaction function introduced by Taylor（１９９３）and is mostly
the same as the baseline specification in Clarida et al.（１９９８）. The lat-
ter paper concluded that the Bank of Japan was forward-looking in
the sense that it responded to forecasted inflation, as opposed to
lagged inflation. Based on their contribution we adopt the forward-
looking reaction function here.
Our estimation method is different from previous works cited above
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in several respects. First, similarly to Rigobon and Sack（２００３）, we
utilize private-sector forecasts of the CPI inflation rate, the real GDP
level and the nominal yen-dollar rate as E［pt＋j Wt］, E［yt Wt］and E［zt＋j
Wt］, as the forecasts of the Bank of Japan are not available.４）The pre-
vious works usually replace the expectation variables in equation（１）
with actual realized values of the variables and apply an instrumental
variables methodology, using as instruments only those variables
known at time t-１ or earlier.
However, an important issue to be considered is that the method
uses past actual values of the variables in its estimation, although pol-
icy is assumed to respond to anticipations of the variables rather than
those actual values. The method is inappropriate as we focus on
whether or how monetary policy can control the expectations of the
persistent changes in the inflation rate and the exchange rate. More-
over, analysis based on the method might not be able to correctly cap-
ture how aggressively and how far in the future the Bank of Japan re-
acted to the expected variables. Here, as Rigobon et al., ibid. did, we
adopt the forecast values of the variables, assuming that those values
are formed based on the set of information available for the Bank of
Japan at the end of the previous quarter. If this assumption is reason-
able, the orthogonality condition between the explanatory variables
and the error term is satisfied and we can use the ordinary least
squares（OLS）method.５）
４）As for the real GDP gap, we utilize contemporaneous forecasts while we
adopt the contemporaneous forecasts through the four-quarter forecasts for
the CPI inflation rate. This treatment is the same as Bernanke and Gertler
（１９９９）and Clarida, Gali and Gertler（１９９８）.
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A second point to note is that equation（１）is known to be optimal
for a central bank that has a quadratic loss function over inflation, the
output gap and the exchange rate gap, given the linear macro-
economic structure（e.g. Svensson（１９９７））. However, recent develop-
ment in the field of exchange rate pass-through emphasizes the non-
linear aspect of the optimal policy reaction. If this is the case, we need
some modification in equation（１）. Corsetti and Pesenti（２００５）ana-
lyzed a general equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy with
monopolistic firms and nominal rigidities. They showed that the opti-
mal policy reaction function was still expressed as the inflation gap
and the output gap, but that the pass-through elasticity could be a
non-linear function of an exchange rate. In such a case, the higher the
pass-through elasticity of the exchange rate into aggregate prices was,
the more contractionary the optimal monetary policy reaction was
found to be. Taylor（２０００）also argued that the optimal policy must
contract monetary conditions more tightly when cost increases from
rises of import prices due to currency depreciations were expected to
be more persistent.６）
Contributions from these theoretical works provide a rationale for
the hypothesis testing of our interest, namely that a central bank can
５）Bernanke and Woodford（１９９７）assumed that a central bank targeted the
private-sector forecast of inflation and the private sector had superior infor-
mation to the central bank, and concluded that inflation-forecast targeting
might have undesirable properties. We have neither of these assumptions
here, although we formulate a forward-looking reaction function. We only as-
sume that the Bank of Japan has equal information to the private sector
since the forecasts of the Bank of Japan are not available.
６）Please also see Amstad and Fischer（２００５） and Campa and Goldberg
（２００２）.
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significantly and strongly manage to stabilize inflation arising through
anticipated depreciation of a domestic currency. This hypothesis also
indicates that the policy response is weaker when the currency is ex-
pected to be transitorily depreciated or to be appreciated. Thus, in
equation（１）, for the optimal response to the inflation gap, b does not
need to be constant and must be larger when the domestic currency
is anticipated to be persistently depreciated by a long way from its
target value.７）
In order to capture this non-linear interaction between the ex-
change rate and the inflation rate, that is the changes in the policy
stance on inflation in the different phases of exchange rate move-
ments, we incorporate an interaction dummy variable into our estima-
tion equation. We call it the‘full specification model’.
it＝const.＋ait－１＋（b＋b０Dt）E［pt＋j Wt］＋（g＋b１Dt）E［yt－y＊ Wt］
＋dE［zt＋j－z＊ Wt］＋ut （２）
where Dt is what is called a depreciation dummy which takes the
value of one when the domestic currency is expected to be depreci-
ated in comparison with the relative Purchasing Power Parity（hereaf-
ter‘PPP’）, and takes the value of zero otherwise. We expect a signifi-
cantly positive value of b０ if the Bank of Japan is concerned about the
inflationary pressure arising through depreciation of the domestic cur-
rency. Actually, we will show later that the independent term of the
exchange rate loses an additional explanatory power when we explic-
itly take account of the effects of the yen-dollar rate on the CPI infla-
７）There is also an incentive for central banks to react to recessionary effects
on output brought by the appreciations of exchange rate.
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tion rate and the real GDP gap. This implies that exchange rate stabi-
lization is important only in relation to controlling the inflation rate
and real GDP.
We need to comment on the data used for the estimations.８）As we
stated above, we utilize the private-sector forecasts of the inflation
rate, the output gap and the exchange rate gap as E［pt＋j Wt］, E［yt Wt］
and E［zt＋j Wt］. For the forecasts of the CPI inflation rate and the real
GDP level, the data are available at The Quarterly Forecast of Japanese
Economy published by The Japan Center for Economic Research（Nihon
Keizai Kenkyu Center）.９）The actual series of the real GDP is available
at The Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office. We also ob-
tain the forecast data of the nominal yen-dollar rate from the Market
Data Survey offered by The Japan Center for International Finance. Two
comments on this data should be noted. First, the survey is based on
one-month, one-quarter and two-quarter forecasts as longer forecasts
are not available. Hence, we use two-quarter forecasts when we esti-
mate the longer-term forecasts of the inflation rate and the real GDP
level. Second, the data is available only from the second quarter of
１９８５. Accordingly, we use future rates of the yen-dollar exchange as
the proxy of the forecasts up to that time.
Finally, we do not adopt a time trend variable and a filtered series
as proxies of y＊ and z＊. Actually, we do not quite understand what
rationale exists for the use of a time trend or a particular type of fil-
tering method as potential levels of output and the exchange rate. For
８）Please also see the Data appendix.
９）We thank Toshiki Jinushi for this data.
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example, Haltmaier（２００１）suggests that the recent Japanese output
gap is considerably larger than a simple Hodrick-Prescott filter would
suggest, and therefore the estimates using the filter may be unreli-
able. Bernanke and Gertler（１９９９, endnote ２５）believe that Japan’s
output has been well below its potential output since about１９９０, and
hence they do not use a simple quadratic trend through１９８９ for their
potential output series.
Taking account of the strong possibility that the Japanese output
gap in the １９９０s was considerably larger than that estimated by a
quadratic trend or a Hodrick-Prescott filter, we use capital and labor
utilization to obtain the potential output level of real GDP. As a target
variable of the yen-dollar rate, z＊, we adopt the relative Purchasing
Power Parity―the ratio of Japan’s CPI to that of the U.S., based on
similar reasoning.１０）
２．２．Estimation results
The baseline specification
Table２ reports the estimation results for the baseline specifica-
tion.１１）Most of the estimated coefficients of the inflation rate, the out-
１０）Please see the Data appendix for the construction of the potential GDP level.
１１）For the estimation to be valid, we assume that all the gap variables as well
as the call rate can be characterized as I（０）for the sample period of１９７９―
９７. We tested it based on the ADF and the GLS-detrended Dickey-Fuller
tests. We rejected the null hypothesis of a unit root for all the four variables
at least at the１０% level based on either of the these two tests, while none of
the variables follows I（０）based on both of these two tests.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler assumed that a possible acceptance of the null hy-
pothesis was attributed to the low power of the test driven by the shortage
of the sample period.
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put gap and the exchange rate gap are statistically significant with
the right sign at least at the ５ percent level（only the coefficient of
the contemporaneous forecast of the inflation rate is statistically insig-
nificant）.
However, this seemingly good result for the baseline specification
may fail to capture the true policy response of the Bank of Japan. The
estimated coefficients of the exchange rate gap may be unrealistically
large. These coefficients imply that the Bank of Japan raised the real
call rate by more than３ percent in response to an expected deprecia-
tion of the yen-dollar rate of１ percent. Moreover, all the estimated co-
efficients of policy reaction against inflation are slightly larger than
one（１．０３０―１．０７５）. Although these magnitudes do not allow a self-ful-
filling burst of inflation and output, they imply that the Bank of Japan
was poorly committed to inflation stabilization. This fact is also incon-
Table ２: Bank of Japan’s reaction function（baseline specification）
（１９７９: I-９７: III）
Forecasts on CPI
inflation rate
Explanatory
variables
Contemporaneous
forecast
１ quarter
forecast
２ quarters
forecast
３ quarters
forecast
１ yaer
forecast
Inflation rate（b） ０．８６４ １．０３０ ＊＊ １．０６３ ＊＊ １．０７３ ＊＊ １．０７５ ＊＊
（１．５８６） （２．７５６） （３．６０８） （３．４２１） （２．９２７）
real GDP gap（g） ０．３５２ ＊＊ ０．３０５ ＊＊ ０．３３５ ＊＊ ０．３９１ ＊＊ ０．４４８ ＊＊
（３．９３５） （３．２９６） （３．１７０） （３．２２７） （３．６００）
Exchange rate gap（d） ４．５４９ ＊ ４．２９３ ＊ ４．６４９ ＊ ４．７００ ＊ ４．７１２ ＊
（２．５４６） （２．３２８） （２．３８１） （２．３１５） （２．３３５）
a）＊＊, ＊ and † denote statistically significant at１,５ and１０ percent levels，respectively.
Numbers in parentheses are t-values.
b）Both standard errors and t statistics are computed by the Newey-West（HAC consis-
tent covariance）estimators.
c） Exchange rate gaps: we use２-quarter forecast value of the yen-dollar rate for estima-
tions with２-quarter to４-quarte forecasts of the inflation rate. We adopt１-quarter fore-
cast value for estimation with１-quarter forecast length of the CPI.
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sistent to the results by the pervious works such as Bernanke and
Gertler（１９９９）and Clarida, Gali and Gertler（１９９８）.１２）１３）
Therefore, we will estimate Japan’s exchange rate policy based on
the more realistic reaction function in the next subsection.
The full specification model
Table３ reports the estimation results based on the full specification
model. It shows that all the estimates of the coefficients on the infla-
tion gap except for the contemporaneous forecast, and also all the esti-
mates for the output gap are statistically significant with the right
sign at least at the ５ percent level. This implies that the Bank of Ja-
pan managed to stabilize the future movements both of the inflation
rate and the real GDP over the sample period（１９７９―９７）. Moreover,
the relative weight put on each of these two goals is quite different
and the Bank of Japan appears to have placed more weight on con-
trolling inflation relative to output stabilization. The estimated coeffi-
cients on the inflation forecasts are more than three times as large as
those on the expected GDP gap（for instance, the estimated coefficient
１２）Nonetheless, we cannot completely exclude a possibility of a self-fulfilling de-
terioration of inflation and output as the variables used here are qualitatively
different from those in the previous works（Please also see Kuroki（２００７））.
１３）We should note major differences in our analysis from those of those previ-
ous works. Although they estimated the same type of forward-looking reac-
tion function, we use qualitatively different measures for the explanatory
variables―the forecast values of inflation, output and exchange rate, instead
of the actual realized values. Further, this paper uses the potential real GDP
as a target output, while the previous works adopted the output gap meas-
ured as the residuals from a quadratic time trend. Third, Bernanke and
Gertler（１９９９）do not include the exchange gap term. Thus, we infer that
the differences in the absolute values of the estimated coefficients are due to
these differences.
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on the one-year inflation forecast is１．５４１while that on the output gap
is０．４５９）.
Now, we turn to the estimation results for the exchange rate pass-
through. Comments are required. The Bank of Japan did not empha-
size exchange rate movements as an independent policy goal. None of
the estimated coefficients on the forecasted exchange rate gap is sta-
tistically significant. It is not surprising that the independent impor-
tance of exchange rate stabilization disappears when we extract the
influence of exchange rate fluctuations on inflation and output. This
Table ３: Bank of Japan’s reaction function（full specification）
（１９７９: I-９７: III）
Forecasts on CPI
inflation rate
Explanatory
variables
Contemporaneous
forecast
１ quarter
forecast
２ quarters
forecast
３ quarters
forecast
１ yaer
forecast
Inflation gap ０．５０４ ０．７１４ ＊ ０．７４０ ＊＊ ０．７２８ ＊＊ ０．７１５ ＊＊
（１．１２８） （２．１７３） （３．０４０） （４．１２７） （４．０８２）
Yen depreciation dummy ０．７８６ ０．６３３ † ０．５９５ † ０．６９５ ＊ ０．８２６ ＊
（１．５０６） （１．６６７） （１．７６４） （２．０９７） （２．１２５）
GDP gap
（Contemporaneous forecast）
０．４１５ ＊＊ ０．３６３ ＊＊ ０．３７９ ＊＊ ０．４１８ ＊＊ ０．４５９ ＊＊
（４．７９５） （４．０６１） （３．８６４） （３．７８２） （３．９７６）
Yen depreciation dummy ０．１７５ ０．１０１ ０．１２３ ０．１７８ ０．２２２
（０．５８３） （０．４０９） （０．４７９） （０．６５０） （０．８０３）
Exchange rate gap ０．６９４ ０．６４０ ０．７３６ ０．６４７ ０．５４７
（０．９３０） （０．９２３） （１．０４８） （０．９０５） （０．７９１）
Lagged call rate ０．７６６ ＊＊ ０．７５２ ＊＊ ０．７７３ ＊＊ ０．７８７ ＊＊ ０．７９３ ＊＊
（１０．６３２） （１１．５１５） （１４．０７６） （１５．８２０） （１７．３６５）
b depreciation １．２９１ １．３４７ １．３３５ １．４２３ １．５４１
b appreciation ０．５０４ ０．７１４ ０．７４０ ０．７２８ ０．７１５
a） ＊＊, ＊ and † denote statistically significant at １，５ and １０ percent levels，respec-
tively．Numbers in parentheses are t-values.
b） Both standard errors and t statistics are computed by the Newey-West（HAC consis-
tent covariance）estimators.
c） Exchange rate gaps: we use２-quarter forecast value of the yen-dollar rate for estima-
tions with２-quarter to４-quarte forecasts of the inflation rate．We adopt１-quarter fore-
cast value for estimation with１-quarter forecast length of the CPI.
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result implies that the exchange rate stabilization was important only
in relation to controlling the inflation rate.
The bottom two lines show the estimated coefficients on the infla-
tion gap based on the different phase of changes in the exchange rate.
The upper line shows the estimated bs during the period of the yen-
depreciation while the lower line indicates those for the period of the
yen-appreciation. Clearly, the Bank of Japan responded differently
against exchange rate fluctuations. It acted aggressively to stabilize
domestic inflation when the exchange rate was expected to depreciate,
but its response was considerably weaker during periods of apprecia-
tion.
All the estimated bs are significantly greater than one during the
depreciation period. For instance, a rise in anticipated annual inflation
of one percent induced the Bank of Japan to raise the real call rate by
５４ basis points. On the contrary, when the yen-dollar rate was appre-
ciated, the estimated bs are less than one. This indicates that the
Bank of Japan did not raise the real interest rate one for one, taking
account of decreasing inflationary pressure or the adverse effects on
the output brought by domestic currency appreciation.
Moreover, the Bank of Japan responded more aggressively to ex-
pected inflation in the long term than to expected inflation in the
short term. The Bank of Japan raised the rate by only３４ basis points
corresponding to rises in the one-quarter and the two-quarter fore-
casts, while it raised the real call rate by５４basis points in response to
a rise in forecasted annual inflation of one percent. This result is also
true for inflation due to domestic currency depreciations. The more
persistent the inflationary pressure caused by expected yen deprecia-
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tions was, the more strongly and preemptively the Bank of Japan re-
sponded to the exchange rate-induced inflation.
The asymmetric reaction by the Bank of Japan can not be seen in
its response to movements of the output gap. None of the coefficients
on the interaction dummy variable for the output gap are statistically
significant. Although the Bank of Japan managed to stabilize real GDP
as an independent policy goal with statistical significance, it was not
concerned about the adverse effects of the currency appreciation on
average.
In summary, the Bank of Japan consistently acted to stabilize both
the inflation rate and real output, while it put more weight on control-
ling inflation relative to output stabilization. The Bank of Japan signifi-
cantly and preemptively managed to stabilize inflation arising through
currency depreciations although its policy response to inflation was
weaker when the yen was expected to appreciate. Furthermore, the
Bank of Japan was quite forward-looking in its policy implementation.
Hence, the more persistent the inflationary pressure arising through
expected depreciation of the yen, the more strongly and preemptively
the Bank of Japan responded to foreign-made inflation.
３．Monetary policy effects on the consumer price index and
the exchange rate
３．１．Estimation method
So far, we have confirmed that the Bank of Japan reacted signifi-
cantly against inflationary shocks arising through expected currency
depreciation. In this section, we examine whether such a policy con-
tributed in isolating domestic aggregate prices from exchange rate-in-
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duced inflationary pressures.
We use a recursive structural VAR, assuming that error terms in
each regression equation are not correlated with the error in the pre-
ceding equations. Our system consists of four variables which are the
exchange rate gap, the real GDP gap, the CPI inflation rate and the
call rate.１４）１５）
We formulate our VAR system in gap terms（except for the infla-
tion rate and the call rate）, instead of levels or differences. The main
reason why we use this formula is derived from the theoretical foun-
dation from works such as Ball（１９９７）, Bernanke and Woodford
（１９９７）, Clarida, Gali and Gertler（１９９８）and Svensson（１９９７）. These
works assume a macro model in gap terms with nominal rigidities to
analyze the optimal monetary policy reactions and rules. We also
maintain consistency with the analysis in the previous section by us-
ing gap terms.
Analogous to Stock and Watson（２００１）, we incorporate the policy
reaction function into the recursive VAR system.１６）The error term of
the policy reaction function（２）can be thought of as a monetary pol-
icy shock, since it represents the extent to which the actual call rate
１４）Again, we assume that all the gap variables as well as the call rate can be
characterized as I（０）for the sample period of１９７９―９７. Actually, we rejected
the null hypothesis of a unit root for all the four variables at least at the１０%
level, where we tested it based on the GLS-detrended Dickey-Fullar test（El-
liot, Rothenberg and Stock（１９９６））with the optimal lag length chosen by
SBIC.
１５）Setting the call rate in first place does not alter the results below, although
we put the call rate in last place assuming an accommodative monetary pol-
icy.
１６）The policy reaction function（２）becomes the interest rate equation in the
recursive structural VAR.
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deviates from the forward-looking Taylor rule. This shock can be esti-
mated by a regression with:
it－｛ait－１＋（b＋b０Dt）E［pt＋j Wt］＋（g＋b１Dt）E［yt Wt］＋dE［zt＋j Wt］｝
as the dependent variable, and a constant and four lags of the ex-
change rate gap, the GDP gap, the inflation rate and the call rate as
the independent variables.
３．２．Estimation results
Impulse response functions and Granger causality tests
The consistent estimators of the impulse responses for the recur-
sive VAR, with the Choleski ordering of the exchange rate gap, the
real GDP gap, the inflation rate and the call rate, are plotted in Fig-
ure３. We also plotted ±２ standard error bands, which yield an ap-
proximate ９５ percent confidence interval for each of the impulse re-
sponses.
Panels A and B of Figure３ show the effect of one standard devia-
tion shock in the exchange rate gap on the CPI inflation rate and the
real GDP gap. An unexpected depreciation of the yen is associated
with a considerable increase in the inflation rate one year later. That
is, an unexpected currency depreciation by１ percentage point statisti-
cally significantly produces an approximately１．５ percentage point in-
crease in the inflation rate at the one year horizon. This point esti-
mate is close to, what they call, the long-run pass-through elasticity of
１．３ obtained by Campa and Goldberg（２００２）. The inflation rate begins
to rapidly increase in response to a depreciation shock and reaches a
peak in the fourth quarter. The confidence interval lies above the hori-
zontal line at around the peak, while the inflationary effect slowly
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fades away over twelve quarters.１７）
Note that, for a firm that imports inputs（or intermediate inputs）to
production, its marginal cost depends on the exchange rate. Then,
Figure ３: Impulse responses of monetary policy and exchange rate shocks
（１９７９―９７）
Note）
１）The Choleski ordering is EGAP（the yen-dollar exchange rate gap）, GGAP
（the real GDP gap）, IGAP（the CPI inflation rate）and CALL（the nominal
overnight call rate）.
２）The dotted lines show the２standard error bands.
１７）This result is consistent with previous works, which showed that high pass-
through of exchange rates was associated with a high inflation rate.
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Panel A indicates that the firm matches an increase in the marginal
cost due to the unexpected currency depreciation by１ percent with a
higher price by１．５percent for one year.
The impact of an unexpected depreciation on the GDP gap（Panel
B）is not significant and this implies that an appreciation of the yen
did not produce a statistically significant adverse effect on the domes-
tic output gap. The result might also indicate the reason why the coef-
ficients on the interaction dummy for the output gap were insignifi-
cant when we estimated the policy reaction function in the previous
section.
Panels C through E of Figure３ reveal the impact of an unexpected
shock in the nominal call rate on the remaining three variables, other
than the call rate itself. As Panel C shows, the monetary policy shock
of one standard deviation brings about a statistically significant and
persistent effect on the expectation of the exchange rate. The yen-dol-
lar rate begins to appreciate in response to an unexpected monetary
contraction and reaches a peak in the fifth quarter. An unexpected
monetary contraction by １ percentage point statistically significantly
produces depreciation of approximately １．４ percentage points at the
five quarter horizon. While the policy impact gradually decreases after
the peak, it still has a statistically significant effect on the exchange
rate even in the twelfth quarter. This result shows that contraction-
ary monetary policy can persistently reduce expected depreciation of
the exchange rate.
Panel D shows that the monetary policy impact is associated with a
considerable effect on the CPI inflation rate after the fifth quarter. Its
contractionary impact produces an almost significant approximately
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０．２ percentage point decrease in the inflation rate within two years.
The monetary policy effect on the inflation rate becomes stronger and
more significant after the fifth quarter when the policy impact on the
expected exchange rate reaches its peak. This coincidence of timing
may also suggest the possibility that monetary policy can at least par-
tially offset exchange rate-induced inflationary pressures by persis-
tently suppressing the expected currency depreciation.
Contrary to the effect on the inflation rate, monetary policy does
not bring about a significant effect on the real GDP gap（Panel E）.
This may suggest that the Bank of Japan succeeded in insulating the
inflation rate from pressures arising through currency depreciation
without having an adverse effect on real GDP.１８）
So far, we have confirmed that the Bank of Japan contributed to ef-
fectively reducing the persistence of the expected fluctuations of the
exchange rate. We have also verified that the expectation of the ex-
change rate is statistically significantly associated with the inflation
rate.
Consequently, we can conclude that monetary policy possibly suc-
ceeded in stabilizing exchange rate-induced inflation by driving a
wedge into（the persistence of）the expected depreciation of the do-
mestic currency.
These findings can be confirmed by the Granger causality test.
Table４ shows the results. First, the nominal call rate causes move-
ments of the expected exchange rate in the Granger sense at the sig-
１８）This may correspond to the soft landing case argued in Taylor（２０００）, pp.
１４００―１４０６.
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nificance level of５ percent. The sum of the estimated coefficients on
the four lags of the call rate is also statistically significant with the
right sign at the level of１ percent. Second, the sum of the coefficients
on the four lags of the expected exchange rate gap statistically ex-
plains the expected inflation rate at the significance level of１ percent,
although the exchange rate does not“Granger-cause”the inflation
rate. This implies that domestic firms pass through expected currency
depreciation by１percent into the aggregate price by０．８３percent for
one year.
The results obtained in this section are consistent with the argu-
ments by Taylor（２０００）. However, our findings differ from Taylor’s
arguments in an important respect. Taylor（２０００）asserted that a low
inflation environment led to a decline in pass-through or pricing
power. Here, we could not confirm this assertion. Neither the exclu-
Table ４: The Granger causality tests
Dependent variable: the exchange rate gap
Independent
variables
Sum
of the coefficients
Linear restriction
（t-statistics）
Exclusion
（F（４，５４）-statistics）
Nominal call rate －０．０９３ ３．３８４＊＊ ３．２９２＊
Inflation rate ０．００２ ０．４４５ １．３７２
（Note）＊＊ and ＊ denote statistically significant at １ percent and ５ percent, re-
spectively.
Dependent variable: the CPI inflation rate
Independent
variables
Sum
of the coefficients
Linear restriction
（t-statisics）
Exclusion
（F（４，５４）-statistics）
Nominal call rate ０．１３０ ０．４５５ ０．９５９
Exchange rate gap ０．８２８ １４．８６７＊＊ １．６３１
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sion test nor the linear restriction test detects the significant influence
of expected inflation on the expected exchange rate. The impulse re-
sponse analysis（Panel F）also shows that an inflationary shock does
not even give rise to a statistically significant depreciation of the ex-
pected exchange rate. Thus, a low inflation environment does not nec-
essarily produce stable expectations on the exchange rate, while we
found the latter gave rise to the former. If low inflation brought about
a persistently stable expectation on the exchange rate, firms might
have an incentive to reduce their markups on final products. Unfortu-
nately, we could not find this transmission.
Table５-A: Forecast error variance decompositions of the expected inflation rate
selected lag
length
Exchange rate
gap
Real GDP
gap
Inflation rate Call rate
２ ０．５９７ ０．０６２ ９８．７３６ ０．６０６
４ ９．８４９ １．５３４ ８７．８４９ ０．７６８
８ １４．２２２ ７．９３５ ７３．６４５ ４．１９８
１２ １３．４１６ １３．４７０ ６６．７０５ ６．４０９
１６ １３．３８３ １４．２６５ ６５．９０９ ６．４４３
Table ５-B: Forecast error variance decompositions of the expected ex-
change rate gap
selected lag
length
Exchange rate
gap
Real GDP
gap
Inflation rate Call rate
２ ９４．５４４ ０．２４６ ０．１１２ ５．０９７
４ ７５．１２６ ５．５７１ ０．８０８ １８．４９４
８ ５２．８６５ １３．９０４ ０．９７３ ３２．２５８
１２ ４７．８１５ １４．３４９ ３．２４８ ３４．５８７
１６ ４５．５６７ １３．８４６ ５．６１３ ３４．９７５
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Forecast error variance decompositions
The above features can be supported by the forecast error variance
decompositions. Table５ shows the results.
For our sample period of１９７９ to１９９７, more than fourteen percent
of error in the forecast of the CPI inflation rate is attributed to ex-
change rate shock over two years. These attributions of the exchange
rate are the likeliest explanation of forecast errors of the inflation rate,
other than its own attributions of the dependent variable at the three
year horizon. While the attributions of the real GDP gap take the
place of those of the exchange rate gap after three years, the attribu-
tions of the exchange rate are still large and almost equivalent to
Table ５-C: Forecast error variance decompositions of the expected real
GDP gap
selected lag
length
Exchange rate
gap
Real GDP
gap
Inflation rate Call rate
２ １．３３１ ９７．８４４ ０．００５ ０．８２０
４ ４．８１３ ９１．９５２ ０．０９２ ３．１４３
８ ３．７５５ ８６．５４０ ４．３２６ ５．３８０
１２ ２．９７３ ８１．３５９ ９．９６１ ５．７０７
１６ ２．６８２ ７７．９９５ １３．７４０ ５．５８３
Table ５-D: Forecast error variance decompositions of the call rate
selected lag
length
Exchange rate
gap
Real GDP
gap
Inflation rate Call rate
２ ２．５８３ ２．５８０ ６．９３７ ８７．９００
４ ２．９６９ ７．４５９ １２．２７３ ７７．２９９
８ ４．４５６ １８．１８１ １７．８９８ ５９．４６５
１２ ６．７７３ １７．５１２ ２５．４０９ ５０．３０７
１６ ７．３２８ １６．４７３ ２９．７０４ ４６．４９５
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those of the real GDP.
As for the variance decompositions of the exchange rate gap, the at-
tributions of the nominal call rate are the likeliest explanation, other
than its own attributions of the exchange rate at the four year hori-
zon. Surprisingly, approximately thirty five percent of error in the
forecast of the exchange rate gap can be ascribed to the call rate
shock.
Consequently, the nominal call rate is likely to explain thirty five
percent of forecast error of the exchange rate and the latter is in turn
likely to explain fourteen percent of changes in the CPI inflation rate.
As the results show, seven percent of forecast error of the inflation
rate is attributed to the call rate shock over four years.
The results based on the impulse response functions（in particular,
Panel A and C）, the Granger causality tests and the variance decom-
positions imply that the nominal call rate was quite a useful instru-
ment to control exchange rate expectations and their persistence and
the Bank of Japan succeeded in stabilizing the inflation rate by driv-
ing a wedge into such persistence of exchange rate expectations.
４．Concluding remarks
In this paper, we verified that expectations on the exchange rate
significantly produced changes in inflation rates and that the Bank of
Japan succeeded in stabilizing inflation rates by controlling the ex-
pected persistence of the exchange rate. However, what we have
found was that central banks can possibly mitigate domestic inflation
by influencing expected movements of exchange rates themselves, al-
though this finding does not necessarily imply that they can control
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firms’pricing powers on final goods and the degrees of markups from
import prices to aggregate prices. Hence, we did not confirm the argu-
ment by Taylor（２０００）that a low inflation environment led to the de-
cline in pass-through or pricing power.
Important problems such as the degrees of pass-through into import
prices, the pricing power or markups of firms, and the optimal cur-
rency choice（the producer currency pricing versus the local currency
pricing）need more precise and elaborate analysis, and may be more
related to the microeconomic structure of each country.
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Data Appendix: The Construction of the Potential real GDP
The potential real GDP
In this paper, we employ the production function approach to calcu-
late the potential GDP in Japan. Previous works such as The Eco-
nomic Planning Agency（２０００）, Kamata and Masuda（２００１）and Mi-
yao（２００４）, utilized the Solow residual derived from the Cobb-Douglas
type production function to calculate the potential GDP. Here, we
adopt the same method, in particular, shown in Kamata and Masuda,
ibid.
Then, the production function can be expressed:
ln Yt＝ln At＋（１－a）ln lKt＋a ln Lt
where, Yt is the level of the real GDP, Kt is the capital stock level, Lt
is the total labor hours（defined as‘working population’multiplied by
‘working hours’）, and At is the Solow residual. All of the variables are
defined in period t. The operating ratio of capital and the coefficient
labor input are expressed as l and a, respectively. The parameter a
is defined as‘Compensation of employees’divided by‘total income’,
assuming the perfect competition.
We construct the operating ratio l as the next step. Since the econ-
omy consists of manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, ln lKt
can be written as:
ln lKt＝ln（lmKm,t＋lnmKnm,t）
where, m indicates the manufacturing industry and nm indicates the
non-manufacturing industry. Unfortunately, the operating ratio of capi-
tal in the non-manufacturing industry lnm is not available.
Previous works usually assumed that the operating ratio of the non-
manufacturing industry was always１００%, and the measurement error
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was included in the Solow residual（ln At）. On the other hand, Kamata
et al., ibid. and Miyao, ibid. argued that we should have calculated the
TFP（Total Factor Productivity）correctly and hence they recom-
mended utilizing the BSI（Business Survey Index）of the non-manu-
facturing industry. In addition, Miyao, ibid. defined the peak of the BSI
as the full operation level of capital.
We basically follow Miyao’s method, but there is another problem:
obtaining a reliable measure of the potential GDP level. While our
sample period is from the first quarter of１９７９ to the third quarter of
１９９７, the BSI is only available from the second quarter of１９８３. Hence,
we constructed an appropriate proxy for the operating ratio of the
non-manufacturing industry from the first quarter of １９７９ to that of
１９８３, which was the‘average of the operating ratio and the Index of
Industrial Production of the manufacturing industry’. This series can
be most smoothly connected to the series based on the BSI at the sec-
ond quarter of１９８３.
As a result, the potential real GDP（Yt）can be calculated as follows:
ln Yt＝ln At＋（１－a）ln lKmax t＋a ln Lmax t
where, Kmax t is the full capital stock level and Lmax t is defined as
the‘maximum working population’multiplied by the‘maximum la-
bor hours’, which is analogous to Kamata et al., ibid.
Data source
・The long run elasticity of the exchange rate pass-through
Campa and Goldberg（２００２）, p.１１, Table１.
・Consumer Price Index
Main Economic Indicators, OECD
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・Real GDP level, Compensation of Employees and Total Income
６８SNA（Seasonal Adjusted）in Annual Report on National Account,
Cabinet Office
・Capital Stock
Capital Stock on Private Sector（６８SNA）with adjustment of pri-
vatization, Cabinet Office
・Working Population
Labor Force Survey（for All Industries）, Ministry of Internal Affair
and Communication
・Working hours
Monthly Labour Survey（All Industries, company with more than
３０ employees）, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
・Business Survey Index
Business Survey Index for Capital Investment（Large Company,
Non-manufacturing）, Ministry of Finance
・Operating Ratio of Capital
Indices of Operating Ratio of Manufacturing（１９９５＝１００）, Ministry
of Economics, Trade and Industry
・Maximum Working Population
We separate two categories:（１）from １５ to ６４ years old and（２）
more than６５years old. Then, we adjust the linear trend of working
population to the peak of original data for each category, and we
add up these two adjusted linear trends.
・Maximum Working hours
In designed hours: As for each sample of（１）１９７８:１―１９８７:４,（２）１９８８:
１―１９９３:４ and（３）１９９４:１―１９９７:３, we calculate the linear trend and
adjust them to the peak of original data.
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Summary
Monetary Policy Effects on the Exchange Rate Pass-through
into an Aggregate Price Inflation
Yoshihiro KUROKI
Across the OECD countries, the degrees of exchange rate pass-
through into aggregate prices are substantially small, although trans-
mission rates from exchange rates to import prices are quite high. In
particular, Japan has experienced the lowest inflation rate while it has
the highest pass-through elasticity into import prices. Recent theoreti-
cal works emphasize the role of monetary policy to isolate aggregate
prices from the external inflationary pressure.
This paper empirically analyzes this role of monetary policy. We
found that expectations of the yen-dollar rate were statistically signifi-
cantly associated with the inflation rate of an aggregate price in Ja-
pan. However, the Bank of Japan reacted significantly against infla-
tionary pressures arising through expected currency depreciations.
We also verified that the policy contributed to effectively reducing the
fluctuations of the expected exchange rate and succeeded in stabiliz-
ing the exchange rate-induced inflation by driving a wedge into the
persistence of the expected depreciations of the yen-dollar rate.
We believe that the experience of the Bank of Japan has important
implications for other central banks.
Key words: exchange rate pass-through, monetary policy reaction, ex-
Summary
２０６ （２０６）
pected exchange rate, inflation of aggregate prices.
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